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Introduction 
Few issues are as central to international politics and diplomacy as conflict and its resolution. 
Sport, on the other hand, may on first consideration appear to be marginal both to 
international politics in general and to conflict more specifically. On closer examination, 
however, the relationship between sport and matters of conflict and peace reveals itself to be 
a complex and important one – whether in everyday manifestations of violence between 
sports fans, such as that which marred the early stages of the recent European football 
championship in France, or symbolised by the lofty goals of the Olympic Movement, which 
profess to contribute to the building of a more peaceful world. Sport has been implicated in 
both inter-state and intra-state conflicts, as demonstrated by the examples of the ‘soccer war’ 
between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969, famously documented by Ryszard Kapuściński, 
and the riot between Dynamo Zagreb and Red Star Belgrade fans at Zagreb’s Maksimir 
stadium in May 1990, which has sometimes been seen as the symbolic start of the violent 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. In the case of intra-state conflicts, violence often leaves sport 
fractured along national, ethnic, religious or linguistic lines. At the same time, sport is 
frequently seen as a means of bringing people together and healing rifts in post-conflict 
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societies, either in a symbolic fashion or in the form of more institutionalised ‘sport for 
development and peace’ (SDP) projects run by non-governmental organisations with the 
support of donors and international organisations. 
While, as the contributions to this book demonstrate, there is a vibrant literature on sport 
from a diplomatic history perspective, students of political science and international relations 
have until recently seemed content to leave the study of sport as a social phenomenon to their 
colleagues in history and sociology departments. Indeed, it has become something of a cliché 
to note that sport has been neglected (or indeed actively dismissed) by political scientists.1 
This claim is increasingly difficult to sustain, though, thanks to a now rapidly growing body 
of work on the politics of sport.2 Much of this literature should be of interest to diplomatic 
historians, and particularly that which examines the role and power of international sports 
organisations and their interactions with states and other international organisations.3 Another 
topic that has received significant attention in the past decade or so has been the SDP sector 
mentioned above – studies of the use of sport to attempt to further development outcomes and 
promote peace-building in developing and post-conflict states have flourished.4 
While this focus on SDP initiatives is welcome, particularly given that the declaration of the 
Sustainable Development Goals adopted in September 2015 proclaims to recognise ‘the 
growing contribution of sport to the realization of development and peace in its promotion of 
tolerance and respect’,5 the focus of this chapter is on a more mundane issue: that of the 
governance of sport in deeply divided societies.6 Unlike the SDP literature, the focus here is 
not on assessing whether and how sport can serve the purpose of lessening divisions between 
groups in such societies, but on how, given that such divisions exist, sport is organised and 
governed – and how a variety of actors have contributed to the shaping of the institutions of 
governance of sport. 
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The chapter identifies broad patterns amongst the types of the institutions used to govern 
sport in three deeply divided societies, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, Bosnia), 
Cyprus and Northern Ireland.7 The chapter draws on some of the existing research on the 
governance of sport in each of these cases, but it also seeks to move beyond the analysis of 
single cases and start to establish more general observations about how sports federations, 
often under the influence of diplomatic actors such as regional and international governing 
bodies, have been designed, in the context of deep societal divisions that are reflected in 
sport. 
The first section of the chapter provides a framework for understanding the types of 
institutional arrangements for governance in deeply divided societies, drawing on the political 
science literature on conflict management. This framework suggests that two broad 
approaches, termed integration and accommodation, can be observed in the design of political 
institutions devised to manage inter-group conflict. The integration-accommodation 
framework is then used as a lens through which to assess the governance of sport in the three 
case studies. Each case study starts with a sketch of the political institutions employed to 
manage conflict in the country concerned, followed by analysis of the governance 
arrangements that exist in the sports sector. The rationale for this approach is to help 
understand not just the approach taken to the design of institutions of sports governance, but 
to do so in the context of considering the broader approach to managing conflict in each case. 
This analysis suggests that there has been a preference amongst a broad range of actors for 
integrative institutional designs for the governance of sport in each of the cases, and that this 
approach is at odds with the design of the same societies’ political institutions, which are 
oriented more towards accommodation. In order to understand this preference, it is necessary 
to appreciate the power of rhetoric emphasising the social value of sport – as exemplified by 
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its incorporation into the Sustainable Development Goals – but also more practical 
considerations about the demands of international competition and the desire of local sports 
actors to secure access to this international realm. The chapter concludes by reflecting on 
opportunities for further research into the institutions of governance of sport in deeply 
divided societies and the role of different actors in establishing and reforming those 
institutions. 
Institutional design in deeply divided societies: Integration versus accommodation 
Before considering the specific issue of the governance of sport, it is necessary to briefly 
survey the broader literature on institutional design in deeply divided societies. A number of 
different attempts have been made to develop classifications, typologies or taxonomies of the 
types of institutions that are employed with the aim of managing conflict between groups.8 
The range of designs identified is wide, incorporating strategies that attempt to eliminate 
divisions between groups by partitioning states along ethnic lines, for instance, through to 
those that attempt to make possible to peaceful sharing of states through granting territorial 
autonomy to groups or establishing political power sharing between them. 
McGarry et al.’s summary of a range of approaches to institutional design helpfully places 
them on a scale between integration and accommodation.9 Integration, they suggest, ‘turn[s] a 
blind eye to difference for public purposes’, and its advocates ‘believe political instability and 
conflict result from group-based partisanship in political institutions’10 and thus ‘reject the 
idea that ethnic difference should necessarily translate into political differences’.11 In this 
sense, integration is a liberal prescription for the depoliticisation of identities through the 
privatisation of cultural difference.12 As Kuperman explains, integration ‘aims to erode the 
political salience of groups that are distinguished by identity or location and instead promote 
a single, unifying nationality through more centralized institutions’.13 In such institutions, 
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integrationists argue, representation should be of individuals, rather than groups, and should 
be based on principles of meritocracy, difference blindness and impartiality, rather than 
descriptive representation. Integrationists are generally hostile to group-based political 
parties, and supportive of civil society organisations that transcend the relevant divisions in 
deeply divided societies. Moreover, while they may support the concept of a federal state, 
they do not favour federations composed of territorial units based on national, ethnic or 
linguistic criteria. Indeed, where relevant, they support unitary state designs over federal 
alternatives.14 
According to McGarry et al., accommodation, by contrast, as a minimum ‘requires the 
recognition of more than one ethnic, linguistic, national, or religious community in the state. 
It aims to secure the coexistence of different communities within the same state’.15 
Accommodationists ‘insist that in certain contexts, national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
divisions and identities are resilient, durable, and hard’, and that ‘[p]olitical prudence and 
morality requires adaptation, adjustment, and consideration of the special interests, needs, 
and fears of groups so that they may regard the state in question as fit for them’.16 
Accommodationist strategies of institutional design aim to provide guarantees to these groups 
‘based on their distinct identity or geographic location, via mechanisms such as proportional 
representation, federalism, autonomy, quotas, economic redistribution, and veto power’.17 
The accommodationist institutional design that is most prominent in the conflict management 
literature is a form of power sharing known as consociationalism. 
Explained briefly, consociationalism describes a form of democracy in which divisions 
between groups in a plural society are managed through institutions that enable co-operation 
between the elite representatives of those social groups. In his influential work on 
consociational democracy, Arend Lijphart identified four key features characteristic of this 
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co-operation. These are elite level power sharing by means of a grand coalition, segmental 
cultural autonomy, proportionality between groups in public positions, and group veto rights 
over vital interests.18 More recent scholarship simplifies the definition to two key features: 
executive power sharing by representatives of the most significant segments of society, and 
territorial forms of self-governance.19 
Most contemporary empirical research on consociationalism focuses, understandably, on its 
adoption via constitutions or peace agreements, either at the state or sub-state level. Some 
authors, however, have started to examine the impacts of the adoption of consociationalism in 
specific policy domains. Fontana, for instance, explores the interplay of Bosnia’s 
consociational political institutions and cultural policy in the country, focusing particularly on 
the museums sector.20 She argues that the emphasis placed on ethnic difference by Bosnia’s 
constitutional arrangements has played out through a tendency for cultural institutions to 
emphasise and preserve parallel, as opposed to intersecting, group histories. Studying the 
governance of sport provides an opportunity to contribute to this expansion of the study of 
approaches to conflict management such as consociationalism, beyond the narrowly political 
arena that has been the focus of previous research. 
Where might diplomacy fit into this research agenda, though? Early research on 
consociationalism tended to neglect the role of external actors in establishing power-sharing 
institutions, but as these have become a more prominent feature of post-conflict settlements, 
so the appreciation of the role of these actors in establishing and maintaining power sharing 
has grown.21 While McGarry et al. argue that integration is the dominant method of 
managing inter-group relations in established democracies – noting, for instance, that it is 
advocated by politicians as the best way to ‘manage’ Europe’s immigrant populations22 – in 
post-conflict and other deeply divided societies, external actors frequently prescribe strategies 
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of accommodation. In particular, consociationalism has been promoted by a range of actors 
including the European Union and the United States,23 and can now arguably be considered 
to be external actors’ favoured method of managing group relations in post-conflict states. 
The governance of sport in three deeply divided societies 
Having identified the types of institutions that are employed to facilitate the governance of 
deeply divided societies, it is now possible to turn to the more specific issue of the 
governance of sport in such contexts. As a ‘constitutive element of everyday life and popular 
culture’,24 sport is not insulated from the effects of conflict in societies that are deeply 
divided along national, ethnic, religious or linguistic lines. Indeed, contrary to the 
assumptions upon which SDP interventions are built, sport in deeply divided societies often 
serves to accentuate existing divisions.25 As Sugden and Tomlinson argue, ‘[s]port in general, 
and football in particular, have proven to be significant theatres for the working up and 
expression of national unity, and its mobilized form, nationalism’.26 Indeed, some authors 
claim that sport is the most powerful form that national performance can take.27 Claims that 
sport contributed directly to the outbreak of violence in cases such as the El Salvador-
Honduras ‘soccer war’ described by Kapuściński or the clashes between Dynamo Zagreb and 
Red Star Belgrade fans at the Maksimir stadium may be debateable,28 but regardless of 
whether the working up of nationalism through sport played a role in the initiation of 
violence, in the aftermath of violent conflict, the very organisation of sport is very often left 
divided along the lines of conflicts. 
While sport in deeply divided societies has been the subject of some research,29 very little 
attention has been paid to how sport is governed in such contexts. Notable exceptions include 
Reiche’s study of the relationship between sport and confessionalism in Lebanon,30 
Coppieters’s investigation of the organisation of marathons in Brussels, Belfast, Beirut and 
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Jerusalem,31 a number of articles and working papers on the organisation of Northern Irish 
sport, including football and cycling,32 Vanreusel et al.’s study of the organisation of sport in 
Belgium,33 and some works that consider the arrangements for the governance of football in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.34 It is with the case of Bosnia that our analysis starts.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The case of the reestablishment of the institutions of governance of football in Bosnia 
following the end of the Bosnian War of 1992-1995, and their subsequent reform under 
international pressure, illustrates two important themes that are central to this chapter. First, 
the initial approach taken in order to facilitate the reunification of the sport was characterised 
by accommodation – allowing three different governing bodies that emerged from the 
conflict to remain in control of the game in their respective territories – but over time, both 
external actors and some local voices were successful in calling for a more integrative 
approach, which has seen the establishment of a single governing body for football in Bosnia. 
Second, the case illustrates the range of actors – both international and local – that are 
involved in sports diplomacy, broadly defined, and how the interests of these actors interact. 
In order to be able to more fully understand the organisation of sport in Bosnia, it is first 
necessary to understand the broader political context of the country. War in Bosnia was 
precipitated by the country’s independence from Yugoslavia in March 1992, although its 
roots can be traced back to Yugoslavia’s first democratic regional elections in 1990, in which 
nationalists were swept to power in most of the constituent republics. According to the 1991 
Yugoslav census, 43.7 per cent of the republic’s population identified as Muslim (now more 
commonly termed Bosniak), 31.4 per cent as Serb, 17.3 per cent as Croat, 5.5 per cent as 
Yugoslav and 2.1 per cent as ‘others and unknown’.35 The war was initially fought between 
Bosnian government forces and Bosnian Serb paramilitaries, who opposed the country’s 
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independence and were actively supported by Belgrade, and who sought to establish an 
independent Bosnian Serb state, which they hoped to later be able to unite with Serbia. Later 
in the war, conflict also erupted between Bosniak and Bosnian Croat forces as the latter 
attempted to gain control of territory in Croat-populated parts of Bosnia, supported by the 
nationalist political leadership in Zagreb, after the latter ousted the more moderate Bosnian 
Croat leadership. 
When the Bosnian conflict was ended by the internationally brokered Dayton Agreement in 
1995, that agreement established a new constitution for Bosnia. This constitution defined the 
country as a state composed of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the Republika Srpska (RS), reflecting the division of the country at the end of the war. 
Extensive powers were reserved for the entities at the expense of the central Bosnian state. 
Each entity has its own president, government and parliament, and within the Federation 
power is further devolved to 10 cantons, each with its own parliament. The Dayton 
constitution guarantees ethnic representation by way of quotas at all levels of government and 
in the civil service. It also established veto rules whereby decisions of the House of 
Representatives (the lower house of the Parliamentary Assembly) require the votes of at least 
one third of the representatives of each entity, and decisions of the House of People (the 
upper house) can be vetoed by a majority of any of the Bosniak, Croat or Serb delegates. 
These three ethnic groups are identified by the constitution as Bosnia’s ‘constituent peoples’. 
The Agreement has been described as establishing a ‘classic example of consociational 
settlement’,36 in which ‘institutions correspond to an ideal-typical consociational 
democracy’.37 
In the past decade, a number of attempts have been made to reform the Dayton constitution, 
in response to criticisms that Bosnian political institutions are not only incredibly inefficient, 
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but also discriminate against citizens who do not belong to one of the recognised ‘constituent 
peoples’.38 Critics argue that the consociational institutions introduced by Dayton have 
reinforced the salience of ethnic divisions in the country and have turned elections into ethnic 
censuses, since the constitution provides ethno-nationalist parties with little incentive to 
appeal beyond the boundaries of their own groups.39 Attempts at externally incentivised 
constitutional reform have failed, however, precisely because of the intransigence of local 
actors who have a vested interest in the maintenance of the system that ensures their 
continued grip on power. Even if constitutional reform were to be successful, however, it 
would be unlikely to involve a significant move away from the consociational approach, 
since the reform proposals that have been advanced all ‘endorse some variation of Dayton’s 
basic compromise’.40 
At the end of the war in 1995, Bosnian sport was also left fractured along ethnic lines. In 
football, three distinct governing bodies emerged from the conflict, each running their own 
leagues.41 It was not until 2002 that a single football federation, the Nogometni/Fudbalski 
Savez Bosne i Hercegovine (N/FSBiH), was formed, under pressure from FIFA, UEFA and 
the International Olympic Committee. As Sterchele notes, the united federation resembled the 
Dayton model.42 The individual ‘ethnic’ federations continued to exist as sub-federations of 
the N/FSBiH, and a tripartite presidency and an executive committee composed of five 
members of each sub-committee were established.43 
This arrangement for the governance of sport, with its echoes of the consociationalism 
employed in the Bosnian constitution, was intended to be an interim measure. As UEFA’s 
head of sports legal services Marcel Benz told the football journalist Jonathan Wilson in 
2011, UEFA were given assurances that, with time, the federation would adopt a single 
presidency in line with common international practice. Despite these assurances, progress 
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proved to be very slow, and the ‘interim’ governance arrangement started to pose problems 
for FIFA and UEFA, with statutes easily blocked due to the voting rules of the N/FSBiH 
executive committee and the federation being represented by three presidents at international 
congresses.44 The N/FSBiH seemed unwilling or unable to tackle significant problems in the 
domestic game, and to respond to pressure from fans to tackle corruption. Fans had been 
protesting against the federation since the formation of the ‘BH Fanaticos’ group in 2000 – 
most notably in an incident in Oslo in March 2007, when they caused a delay of more than an 
hour to a match against Norway by throwing flares on to the pitch, in order to highlight the 
issue of corruption within the N/FSBiH. 
In response to the problems facing the governance of football in Bosnia, in October 2010, 
FIFA and UEFA demanded reform of the N/FSBiH within six months, including a 
requirement that the tripartite presidency be replaced. This demand met with significant 
resistance. Bosnian Serb representatives within the N/FSBiH opposed reform for fear that it 
would put at risk their political autonomy, but there was also some resistance from Bosnian 
Croats, who claimed that FIFA’s actions were an insensitive foreign imposition.45 When the 
deadline passed in April 2011 and reforms had not been agreed, the federation was suspended 
by FIFA and UEFA, meaning that the Bosnian national team and Bosnian clubs could not 
compete in international or European competition. 
Even with the suspension, political opposition to reform remained. The RS president, Milorad 
Dodik, maintained that he was ‘against one president being elected for the whole of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in any state structure – you name it, even a bee-keeping association’.46 FIFA’s 
Emergency Committee immediately imposed a ‘normalisation committee’ on the N/FSBiH 
and tasked it with making the required reforms. Headed by former Bosnian player Ivica 
Osim, within two months the committee adopted a new statue, allowing the suspension to be 
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lifted in late May 2011 and paving the way for the first single president in the federation’s 
history to be elected in December 2012.47 In a very short space of time, then, a combination 
of pressure from below, in the form of fan protests, and from FIFA and UEFA above, 
resulted in significant changes to the governance of football in Bosnia. This achievement was 
perhaps also dependent on a significant degree of luck, as FK Borac Banja Luka, from the 
capital of the RS, had just won their first Bosnian Premier League title, and would have been 
denied the chance to play in the qualifying rounds for the UEFA Champions League had the 
suspension not been lifted. Borac fans and officials lobbied for acceptance of the reforms, 
resulting in the overcoming of political resistance in the RS.48 While the reasons for this 
apparent success may be complex, it is notable that whereas the international community has 
struggled for more than a decade to reform the Dayton constitution, reform of the governance 
of football in Bosnia has been achieved more quickly. Moreover, it has taken a significant 
step away from the consociational power-sharing approach of Dayton in a more integrative 
direction.49 Understanding this outcome, as the analysis above suggests, requires that we 
understand the complex interaction of a range of actors – including national and sub-national 
federations, international governing bodies, fans’ groups and politicians. 
Cyprus 
The division of sport on the island of Cyprus has a history that dates back much longer than 
the conflict that Bosnia experienced in the 1990s. Meaningful sporting competition involving 
both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots effectively ceased in the 1950s – long before the 
formal partition of the island in 1974 – and it is only recently that progress has been made 
towards the possible reunification of sport across the inter-communal divide. As in the 
Bosnian case, it is football in particular that has been in the international spotlight, thanks to 
FIFA-facilitated negotiations involving the country’s two football federations. As the analysis 
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in this section demonstrates, however, the process underway in Cyprus is a more 
domestically driven one than that witnessed in Bosnia, with the main impetus for 
reunification coming from within the federations themselves. Before examining these recent 
developments in sport, however, it is again necessary to first understand the broader political 
context. 
Cyprus became independent from the United Kingdom in 1960, following a period of conflict 
between the British authorities and Greek Cypriot guerrillas, who favoured unification with 
Greece. During the 1960s, there were several periods of inter-communal violence between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In 1963, there was a constitutional breakdown, and the 
following year a United Nations peacekeeping force was established and tasked with 
preventing further violence. While tensions between the two communities diffused in the late 
1960s, in 1974 the Greek military junta and the Cypriot National Guard ousted the Cypriot 
president in a coup. Turkey responded by launching an invasion, which captured the north of 
the island. Cyprus has remained divided ever since. The internationally recognised Republic 
of Cyprus government has effective control only of the south of the island, and the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is only recognised as a state by Turkey. 
The most significant attempt to reunify the island came in the early 2000s, when United 
Nations-led negotiations resulted in a proposed plan for reunification, known as the Annan 
Plan, after the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The plan underwent a number of 
revisions before being put to a referendum in April 2004. In the public vote, the majority (65 
per cent) of Turkish Cypriots backed the plan, but it was rejected on the Greek Cypriot side, 
by a wide majority of 76 per cent of voters.50 
Had it been adopted, the Annan Plan would have established a constitutional structure based 
on principles of federalism and consociationalism. The plan itself cited Switzerland as a 
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model for its proposed Cypriot constitution but, as Bose notes, it also resembled Bosnia’s 
Dayton Agreement and Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement.51 The proposed 
constitution would have established a bicameral parliament with an upper house (the senate) 
whose seats would have been divided evenly between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and a 
lower house (the chamber of deputies) made up of representatives of each constituent state in 
proportion to their populations, with each being guaranteed a minimum 25 per cent of the 
seats. While the Annan Plan foresaw decisions being made on the basis of a simple majority, 
in the senate this would have needed to include a quarter of the voting representatives of each 
state and for certain areas of critical interest, a special majority of at least 40 per cent of the 
senators from each state would have been required. A presidential council was to have been 
established, made up of nine members with the approval of at least 40 per cent of the senators 
of each state, including at least two members from each state. The president of this council 
would have acted as head of state and government, and the office of both president and vice-
president would have alternated between representatives from the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
states every 20 months, such that at any one time one of these offices was to be held by a 
Greek Cypriot and the other by a Turkish Cypriot.52 
The division of Cyprus since 1974 has had an inevitable impact on the organisation of sport 
on the island, not least because of the impossibility of most Cypriots crossing the so-called 
‘Green Line’ that has divided the two communities geographically, at least until the easing of 
border restrictions in 2003.53 In fact, as mentioned above, communal sporting division pre-
dates the political and physical division of the island. Kartakoullis and Loizou note, for 
example, that the last season that Turkish Cypriot football teams competed in competitions 
organised by the Cyprus Football Association (CFA) was 1954-55, after which they were 
prevented from using sports facilities in the name of maintaining good community relations 
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in the context of the Greek Cypriot anti-colonialist struggle.54 While this was supposed to be 
a temporary measure, until the potential for inter-communal violence was over, it resulted in 
the Turkish Cypriot teams forming their own federation, the Kıbrıs Türk Futbol Federasyonu 
(CTFA). Because FIFA and UEFA recognise only the CFA as the legitimate Cypriot football 
federation, and have turned down the CTFA’s requests to be recognised as a member 
federation, Turkish Cypriot football has remained internationally isolated.55 
Since the 2004 referendum, however, there have been attempts to reunify the organisation of 
Cypriot football. Following the Greek Cypriot vote against the Annan Plan, the CTFA made a 
further attempt to join FIFA, and in meetings with FIFA officials, its representatives accepted 
a plan to recognise the authority of and join the CFA. The plan was opposed by Turkish 
Cypriot politicians, however, and this prevented any progress towards its implementation.56 
More recently, further FIFA-facilitated talks have taken place. In November 2013, following 
negotiations in Zurich, the CFA and the CTFA signed a provisional agreement which, if 
implemented, will result in the CTFA becoming a member of the CFA, thus unifying football 
governance on the island.57 A year and a half later, in March 2015, CTFA officials announced 
that they were going ahead with plans to join the CFA.58 This decision attracted criticism 
from the then TRNC deputy prime minister and Minister of Economy, Tourism, Culture and 
Sports, Serdar Denktaş, who threatened to cut off funding to clubs in the event of the 
implementation of the agreement. There is also opposition on the Greek side, with some clubs 
voting against the proposed merger in a secret ballot held by the CFA.59 However, the 
election of Mustafa Akıncı as the new TRNC president in April 2015 has signalled a political 
environment more conducive to unification.60 At the time of writing, the football agreement 
had yet to be implemented, in part due to complications regarding the legal status of the 
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CTFA.61 However, the intent to merge the two federations on the island now seems to be well 
established. 
The type of institutional arrangement that is envisaged for unified Cypriot football differs 
significantly from those of Bosnia’s interim arrangements discussed above. While the text of 
the provisional agreement does not specify the exact arrangements to be adopted, one of its 
provisions is that the CFA will recognise the competence of the CTFA to organise its own 
competitions amongst its member clubs. As such, no joint league is envisaged.62 In this sense, 
the arrangement is more limited than that of Bosnia, where a unified league structure was 
created. This difference is more a reflection of the significant financial gulf between the 
relatively well financed Greek Cypriot clubs and their Turkish Cypriot counterparts, which 
are semi-professional at most and largely dependent on state funding, than it is of a desire to 
accommodate the identities of the two parties, however. No new association would be formed 
either; rather, the CTFA would become a member of the existing CFA. Unlike in Bosnia, the 
CTFA would not be guaranteed representation through a power-sharing presidency. In their 
provisional agreement, the two bodies agreed to the establishment of a steering committee to 
consider how Turkish Cypriot representation in the CFA’s committees and assembly would 
be ensured. As of September 2015, it was envisaged that this representation will be on the 
same basis as that of each of the existing divisions of the Greek Cypriot leagues.63 
Another significant difference between the Cyprus case and that of Bosnia concerns the 
motivations of the domestic actors. Whereas in the case of the eventual reform of the interim 
governance arrangements in Bosnia, local actors (with the notable exception of fans) were 
resistant to reform and a solution was imposed from outside through FIFA’s intervention, in 
Cyprus the initiative to unify the two federations is a largely domestic initiative. While FIFA 
has facilitated talks between the parties, the main driver of progress has been the CTFA’s 
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concern to end the international isolation of Turkish Cypriot football. The association’s 
president has written that the agreement reached in Zurich in November 2013 promises to end 
‘more than three decades of isolation’ and ‘to give hope to our clubs, to our players and 
above all to our youth who all strive to gain access to this global village of the sport called 
football’.64 
Northern Ireland 
Our final case study is Northern Ireland. As the analysis will show, this case has also been 
characterised by an approach to the governance of sport that can be categorised as integrative, 
and which notably also stands in contrast to the power-sharing approach that has formed the 
basis for the political settlement of the wider conflict. However, whereas the two cases 
discussed so far have illustrated varying degrees of involvement of international governing 
bodies, the Northern Ireland case is one where the governance of sport has been a largely 
domestic affair – albeit with cross-border Irish dimensions. 
In order to understand the context of the governance of sport in Northern Ireland, it is 
necessary to first consider the history of the state. While the partition of Ireland in 1921 
created a Northern Irish state that had a comfortable Protestant majority who supported 
continued union with the United Kingdom, it did not resolve the conflict between those 
Protestant unionists and nationalists, overwhelmingly from the Catholic minority, who 
instead preferred a united Ireland. It was not until the late 1960s, however, that this conflict 
escalated into what became known as ‘the Troubles’ – a 30-year violent conflict fought 
between republican paramilitaries (most notably the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(IRA)) on one side and the British state and loyalist paramilitaries on the other. During this 
period, around 3,600 people were killed, making the Troubles Western Europe’s most deadly 
conflict since the end of the Second World War. 
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Significant progress was made towards peace during the 1990s, with an IRA ceasefire 
declared in 1994, and since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland has been 
governed under an arrangement in which significant powers are devolved from the United 
Kingdom government to a power-sharing administration in Belfast. The text of the agreement 
acknowledges ‘the substantial differences between our continuing, and equally legitimate, 
political aspirations’, but states that ‘we will endeavour to strive in every practical way 
towards reconciliation and rapprochement within the framework of democratic and agreed 
arrangements’. It established the Northern Ireland Assembly and a number of transnational 
bodies such as the North/South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Council, in order to 
commit the parties to ‘partnership, equality and mutual respect as the basis of relationships 
within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and between these islands’.65 Northern 
Ireland’s political institutions, established in 1998 and revised by the October 2006 St 
Andrews Agreement, ‘are widely agreed to be consociational in nature, albeit with external 
federal and confederal aspects’.66 
Executive power in the Northern Ireland Assembly is shared according to electoral strength. 
The electoral system is proportional, and ministerial portfolios are automatically allocated by 
a mathematical formula. All members of the assembly must designate themselves as 
‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’. The executive is headed by a first minister and a deputy 
first minister, and these roles are allocated to the leaders of the first and second largest parties 
in the assembly, providing that these two parties do not belong to the same community bloc. 
There are also voting rules within the assembly designed to ensure cross-community support 
for legislative decisions, with important decisions requiring the support of majority of both 
unionist and nationalist members as well as an overall majority, or the support of at least 40 
per cent of the members of each bloc and a 60 per cent overall majority.67 
Forthcoming in Rofe, J.S. and Dichter, H.L. (eds.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games within 
Games, Manchester: Manchester University Press 
19 
 
Whereas the design of Northern Ireland’s political institutions is very clearly premised on the 
accommodation of unionist and nationalist identities and interests, the organisation of sport in 
Northern Ireland is arguably more integrative (even if individual sports have been associated 
more with one particular community than the other). Many sports are in fact organised on an 
all-Ireland basis, with international representation based on teams that span Northern Ireland 
and the Republic.68 Rugby, for example, has been organised on this basis since before Irish 
independence in 1922, and this model survived the partition that accompanied independence. 
Whyte observes that ‘middle-class’ sports including rugby, tennis and golf are more likely to 
be all-Ireland in their organisation than ‘proletarian’ sports such as cycling and (association) 
football (Gaelic sports, he argues, ‘have always kept as a matter of principle to an all-Ireland 
basis’).69 
Cycling provides an interesting example here, because there used to be three governing 
bodies for the sport on the island of Ireland. As Howard explains, two of these, the Northern 
Ireland Cycling Federation (NICF) and the Irish Cycling Federation (ICF), were recognised 
as national governing bodies by the Union Cycliste International (UCI), whereas the third, the 
all-island National Cycling Association (NCA), was not.70 In the late 1980s, it was proposed 
that the three bodies be merged to form the Federation of Irish Cyclists (FIC), although a vote 
of the membership of the NICF did not achieve the required two-thirds majority to approve 
this. Individual cycling clubs responded by leaving the NICF and forming the FIC-affiliated 
Ulster Cycling Federation, which was recognised by the Sports Council for Northern Ireland 
as the official governing body. The FIC became the only governing body recognised by the 
UCI. While the NICF continued to resist integration of the sport across the border for many 
years,71 in December 2006 its membership voted in favour of joining the Ulster Cycling 
Federation.72 
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The organisational split in football, meanwhile, remains, with Northern Ireland and the 
Republic maintaining separate leagues and national teams. However, within Northern Ireland, 
attempts have been made to make football more inclusive, in order to address the perception 
that Northern Irish football is dominated by unionist interests. In April 2000, the British 
government set up an Advisory Panel to the Minister of Culture, Arts and Leisure to create a 
strategy for football in Northern Ireland. The report of the Advisory Panel noted that many 
Catholics felt uncomfortable and unsafe at international matches (it is notable that many 
Catholic players opt to represent the Republic of Ireland instead of Northern Ireland), and 
that sectarian conflict amongst fans was a barrier to improving community relations through 
football. Nonetheless, the report noted that football enjoys significant support across the 
community divide, and offers possibilities for cross-community reconciliation. It 
recommended the adoption of an anti-sectarianism strategy to enable this potential to be 
realised.73  As Bairner explains, ‘[a]s football could not be allowed to appear to operate under 
the hegemonic control of unionists, political encouragement was voiced for integrationist 
strategies aimed at making support for the Northern Ireland “national” team more 
inclusive’.74 
However, Bairner suggests that this approach contrasts with, and is potentially undermined 
by, the broader political and institutional context in Northern Ireland. He argues that attempts 
to make sport more inclusive ‘are expected to bear fruit in a political context in which 
sectarian differences have been legitimized and even given formal recognition through those 
very mechanisms that are intended to help create a more peaceful and less polarized Northern 
Ireland’,75 referring to the consociational nature of the Good Friday Agreement. He concludes 
that ‘in the world of sport, citizens are being asked to set aside the trappings of cultural 
difference in the interests of social inclusion and cross-community integration’, but that ‘the 
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resultant policies are fundamentally at odds with those that have been promoted in other areas 
of society, not least in the political process itself’, where societal divisions have instead been 
institutionalised.76 As in both Bosnia and Cyprus, then, prescriptions for the governance of 
sport are significantly more integrationist than those for the broader political management of 
conflict.  
In search of explanations: Conclusions and directions for further research 
In all three of the cases outlined above, the empirical evidence presented suggests that the 
governance of sport is more integrative, or at least has been moving in a more integrative 
direction, than the wider political institutions of the country concerned. How can we explain 
this pattern? What explanations might we pursue when attempting to explain why national 
and international sports governing bodies have pressed for more integrative governance 
arrangements than we find employed in constitutions and peace agreements? 
One explanation is that this approach might partly reflect the rhetorical impact of the claims 
that sports administrators frequently make about the supposed unifying impact of sport. For 
example, Eick has argued that, ‘[i]n marketing football publicly including its political role, 
FIFA emphasizes football’s social use-value and constantly highlights the capacity of football 
to boost “social cohesion” as stated in the FIFA objectives: “to improve the game of football 
constantly and promote it globally in the light of its unifying, educational, cultural and 
humanitarian values”’.77 Indeed, this rhetoric now extends beyond the world of FIFA and 
other sports governing bodies, as reflected in its incorporation into the declaration of the 
Sustainable Development Goals. Applied to the Bosnian case, it could be argued that when 
presented with evidence of division, politicisation and corruption in Bosnian football, FIFA 
and UEFA could hardly not act, given their rhetoric that sport has the power to unify.78 One 
avenue of further investigation might therefore be to examine whether a form of ‘rhetorical 
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entrapment’79 is associated with the importance that international organisations have attached 
to sport for development and peace, regardless of the extent to which they actually believe in 
this discourse. 
We should not overlook more pragmatic explanations of the actions of both international and 
national governing bodies. The organisation of international sport, which is premised on the 
representation of states by national teams, does not sit easily with local arrangements that 
seek to accommodate societal divisions through the existence of multiple governing bodies. 
There is a clear mismatch between the various forms of autonomy associated with 
accommodationist strategies of conflict management and the demands of international 
governing bodies, which, due to the nature of international sport, are likely to prefer unitary 
national governing bodies. In the Bosnian example, a clear motivation behind FIFA and 
UEFA’s attempts to reform the N/FSBiH was not the desire to contribute to more harmonious 
inter-ethnic relations (though that might be part of the explanation), but to address concerns 
about Bosnia’s undue influence on the international stage that stemmed from its federation’s 
tripartite presidency, and to tackle the considerable problems that existed within the domestic 
game. Pragmatic concerns also help to explain the CTFA’s commitment to joining the Cyprus 
Football Association and unifying football governance on the island. As noted above, while 
the CTFA have faced significant opposition to this plan from some Turkish Cypriot 
politicians, they continue to pursue the goal of merging with the CFA as a way of ending the 
almost complete isolation of Turkish Cypriot football. 
These concerns suggest that the integrative direction of sports governance, in the three case 
studies presented here, might not be a deliberate alternative to more accommodative 
approaches to conflict management such as consociationalism, so much as a pragmatic 
response to the demands of international competition. Further research should investigate not 
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only the ways in which sport is governed in deeply divided societies, but also the driving 
forces behind the establishment of different institutional designs in the governance of sport. 
Here, there is also a need to more fully appreciate the relative importance of different actors, 
at both the national and international level. While FIFA and UEFA’s suspension of the 
Bosnian football federation in order to tackle governance concerns stemming from ethnic 
division might be unique (Meier and García suggest that by far the most common trigger of 
such interventions is instead government interference),80 there are perhaps subtler forms of 
international influence over national governing bodies that are worth investigating. The 
Bosnian case also highlights the potential importance of pressure from below – that is to say, 
from sports fans. 
Rofe has noted the large number of actors (or players, to use his sporting analogy) involved 
in sports diplomacy.81 The cases considered here demonstrate the need to take into account 
the motivations and interests of these different actors, and how they interact to produce the 
types of institutional outcomes that we witness. As a comparison of the Bosnian and Cypriot 
football experiences demonstrates, the motivations of local actors can differ significantly 
from case to case, even where the outcomes might be superficially similar. Whereas in 
Bosnia, FIFA and UEFA (along with fans) faced resistance to reform from within the 
country’s football federation, in Cyprus the initiative to unify the governance of the game on 
the island has been driven by the local federations – and the CTFA in particular. In both the 
Bosnian and Cypriot cases, however, nationalist political elites have voiced their opposition 
to closer integration. 
Another question that might inform further research into the governance of sport in deeply 
divided societies concerns the effects of these governance arrangements on broader issues of 
conflict and identity, and would thus serve to link this research back to the concerns of the 
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sport for development and peace literature. If, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the aim of 
integrationist approaches to institutional design is to promote a shared sense of identity 
through the adoption of centralised institutions, then what impact do these types of 
institutions have when employed in the governance of sport? Will a unified Cypriot football 
federation promote a stronger sense of Cypriot identity, transcending Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot ethnic identities, amongst players and fans of the sport? Alternatively, might unified 
institutions in sport simply be the exception to the rule, and co-exist alongside continued 
societal division? The latter possibility is exemplified by the case of football in Northern 
Ireland, where there are ‘signs of a Northern Irish football consciousness, perhaps, but not of 
an emergent Northern Irish political consciousness, far less a “national” identity’.82 In the 
Bosnian case, while headlines in international media coverage of the national football team’s 
appearance at the 2014 World Cup may have suggested a country uniting behind the multi-
ethnic team,83 the reality is somewhat more complex, with many Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian 
Croats indeed supporting the Bosnian national team, but often as a secondary team to that of 
Serbia or Croatia.84 
While ‘sport for development and peace’ initiatives appear to have captured the attention of a 
significant number of scholars from across the social sciences in the past decade, those 
political scientists with an interest in sport have so far largely neglected the question of how 
sport is governed in deeply divided societies. This is perhaps surprising, given the attention 
that has been paid in general to questions of institutional design in such societies. This 
chapter set out to address this gap in the literature and, in doing so, has demonstrated the 
integrative direction of sports governance in Bosnia, Cyprus and Northern Ireland. It has 
provided some tentative explanations for why integrative institutions have emerged in sport, 
in the context of environments where political institutions are characterised more by 
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accommodation than integration. Some of the issues highlighted here, such as the relationship 
between local and international actors and between institutions and identities, speak to 
important debates within political science, international relations and the study of diplomacy, 
and will hopefully provoke further comparative research into the governance of sport in 
deeply divided societies. 
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